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Abstract
Why do administratively competent states sometimes leave substantial swathes of their
territory ungoverned? We explore this question in the context of the Frontier Crimes Regulation
(FCR) in Pakistan, a British Colonial law only abrogated in 2018, that left legal decisions up
to local customary councils. This contrasts with areas where the British and Pakistani state
built modern political and bureaucratic institutions. Using primary legal documents we create
a dataset of when and where FCR applied between 1901 and 2012. Exploiting spatial variation
in the Green Revolution’s impact in the 1960s, we show that governance was preferentially
extended to places where the state stood to benefit the most in terms of land revenue. Our
results show that technological changes which shift the returns to control influence where states
choose to govern.
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1 Introduction
Territory with little or no effective state presence—ungoverned space—persists in many de-
veloping countries (for example, Colombia, India, Morocco, Myanmar, New Guinea, and
Pakistan, among others). In addition to having few state services, these areas also provide
room for terrorists, smugglers, drug manufacturers, and criminals to operate, creating nega-
tive externalities locally and globally. Pakistan has many such areas, and has had them for
over a century, as both a British colony and an independent nation. Unusually among such
states, the legal status of ungoverned space in Pakistan is set forth in law, the Frontier Crimes
Regulation (FCR) of 1901. This law cleanly delineates between areas with state institutions
and areas subject to customary tribal law, and allows for documenting how these areas have
changed over time. The history of the FCR thus provides a unique opportunity to study
the determinants of state control. We study one key predictor of the extent of the FCR
jurisdiction over time—potential government revenue as it was impacted by technological
change during the Green Revolution.
During colonial rule, the British divided Pakistan into two main regions. The first was
the Raj—areas where the British built modern political and bureaucratic institutions. This
included a modern legal system, a tax system, a civil service, and an army. The second was
governed according to the Frontier Crimes Regulation.1 Here, the British put a small number
of “political agents” in charge of large tribal areas with almost no colonial institutions backing
them. Instead, institutions already in existence were given the force of law, and traditional
local councils, or Jirgas, made most legal decisions and were allowed to continue collective
punishment. As a result of the British division, independence and subsequent partition left
roughly half of modern-day Pakistan effectively ungoverned by the state. Over time, all of
Pakistan has been removed from the FCR, with the small regions along the Afghan border
known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and a few small Provincially
Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) being removed only in 2018.2
1There was also a third way of indirect governance in what were called “princely states”,
including most notably Kashmir, but these were not nearly so prominent as in areas that
are now within India.
2These areas have periodically provided safe haven to domestic and international terror-
ists. Training facilities operate openly and with impunity to this date in some of them.
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We theorize a cost-benefit logic for ungoverned space with a simple framework in which a
central authority’s cost of implementing full institutions is relatively static while the benefits
of doing so can shift quickly due to technological innovations. This approach has two sharp
predictions. First, technological innovation should increase the amount of territory governed
by the central authority. Second, since costs are heterogeneous within states, areas that
benefit relatively more should be more likely to be integrated. Our core objective in this
paper is to empirically test this logic.
We test this cost-benefit logic in two stages. First, we make use of geo-spatial information
and crop suitability data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
to study why the British chose to apply FCR to over half of modern-day Pakistan in 1901.
Once we condition on proxies for local productivity and the cost of imposing state institutions
we find no correlation between a sub-district’s crop suitability for wheat (the main crop
influenced by the Green Revolution in Pakistan) and the initial British choice to apply
FCR. This first result is correlational. It is consistent with our hypothesis that increased
potential revenue should have increased the British government’s desire to govern many parts
of Pakistan if it was the costs of implementing institutions that was much more binding
initially.
Next, we exploit the differential impact of the Green Revolution by crop suitability to
understand Pakistan’s decisions to continue to apply or to roll FCR back across parts of
the country throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The technological innovations of the Green
Revolution created a plausibly exogenous differential increase in agricultural land value.
In this case, the Green Revolution in South Asia is widely understood to have increased
productivity for wheat more in marginal areas than in already-productive regions—it allowed
lower-suitability sub-districts to ‘catch-up’ to other districts in potential revenue extraction.
These originally-marginal areas would then be more likely to switch from expected revenue
negative to positive as a result of the Green Revolution, and should be relatively more likely
to be integrated into the state.
Our results suggest a substantively large correlation between small productivity changes
and integration. A one unit increase in crop suitability is associated with a 9.6 percentage
points differential increase in the likelihood that FCR continues to be applied to a sub-
district following the Green Revolution. This result has a causal interpretation to the extent
that: (i) the initial decision to apply the FCR was conditionally-independent of wheat crop
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suitability (which it appears to have been); and (ii) the timing of the Green Revolution
varietals’ introduction in Pakistan was exogenous to planned changes in the extent of the
FCR.
We provide corroborating evidence for a productivity change using data from the 1960
and 1972 agricultural censuses in Pakistan. We show that areas of low wheat suitability saw
disproportionate increases in the amount of farm land being fertilized and in the number of
farms using fertilizer between these years. This suggests that the extension of state control
led to shifts in investment decisions in the same pattern our simple logic predicts.
It is important to acknowledge that in Pakistan there were no widespread violent conflicts
when the government integrated outlying regions, that integration was broadly supported
both by the state and by citizens living in peripheral regions.3 In the language of our theory,
this uncontested governance implies that any revenue extraction after integration must have
left the representative individual at least as well off as they were under informal government.
While far from conclusive, such is plausible as access to public goods provided by the central
authority, such as roads, access to courts and greater protection of property rights, and access
to government support for agricultural production (i.e. access to high-yielding variety of
seeds)—a highly relevant consideration during the state-led Green Revolution in Pakistan—
may increase interest in integration.4
This paper makes at least two contributions. First, we contribute to a literature on
empirical attempts to understand the initial choice to govern a space during colonial times.
Several competing hypotheses have emerged to explain the broad patterns in the historical
record: (i) the availability of resources, and the ease with which they can be extracted
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001); (ii) natural terrain, and the military advantage
it affords indigenous groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Nunn and Puga, 2012); and/or (iii)
the efficiency of indirect governance (Padro´ i Miquel and Yared, 2012; Scott, 2009). All
three perspectives are consistent with the British decision to set up minimal governance
3As such, our focus is different from work on how order emerges during wartime (Stani-
land, 2012).
4In the words of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), policy preferences in peripheral regions will
shift to be more aligned with the central authority’s policy, resulting in a new equilibrium
with greater integration of peripheral regions.
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institutions in areas initially under the FCR. Other related studies have focused on the role
of public finance in the emergence of the modern democratic state (Stasavage, 2003), on the
emergence of modern fiscal systems (Dincecco, 2011), and on the formation of state capacity
(Berwick and Christia, 2018).
Second, we contribute to a literature studying changes over time in state presence within
internationally-recognized borders. Several authors have modeled these changes: (i) based
on a vote cost-benefit analysis by parties (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos, 2013; Migdal,
1988; Fearon, 1994); according to constrained kleptocrats who may find it optimal to not
control their entire territory (Grossman and Noh, 1990,9); when the expenditures required
to efficiently contest rebel control are high relative to the costs rebels can impose (Berman,
Shapiro, and Felter, 2011); when there are changes in the power structure in the peripheral
proto-state (Gerring et al., 2011); and/or (iv) when one gains rents from having limited
ungoverned space within one’s territory (Felter, 2006; Bapat, 2011). All of these papers
suggest a simple cost-benefit calculus: extend control to a given region when the net benefits
of doing so exceed the costs. Lee (2018) adds to this discussion by accounting for international
factors.
A related literature documents the socioeconomic impacts of these important institu-
tional decisions.5 Iyer (2010) compares British direct colonial rule to indirect rule (princely
states). The author finds that areas under indirect rule have better education, health, and
road systems in the postcolonial period. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) study variation in land
revenue institutions, finding that areas of the Raj with landlords subsequently have less in-
vestment in land as well as in education and health. Others have studied variation in rulers’
religions identity (Chaudhary and Rubin, 2016), in industrial investment (Gupta, 2014), and
in political elites (Cheema, Mohmand, and Patnam, 2009). Others yet have studied the lim-
its of the impacts of long-term colonial institutions (Chaudhary and Garg, 2015; Roy, 2002).
A closely link literature studies the impact of the partition of India at independence (see,
for example, Bharadwaj and Fenske (2012); Bharadwaj and Mian (2015)).
Our results provide new evidence on the importance of technology-driven changes in
potential government revenue for the choice to integrate peripheral areas into the state. We
5We would ideally also directly test the long-term impacts of the FCR but have not found
modern household socioeconomic data with sufficient geographic coverage for this exercise
in Pakistan.
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also provide additional evidence on the importance of the Green Revolution in South Asia.
Our novel contribution to the literature on state development is to provide concrete evidence
that technological change can lead to ungoverned spaces being folded into country’s cores
without civil war or serious violence. What stopped the government from integrating major
parts of Pakistan, and those living in these peripheral areas from consenting to integration
without violence, may have been, at least in part, a simple cost-benefit calculation.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides additional background on the FCR,
Section 3 provides a simple model to give us intuition on the choice to govern, Section 4
outlines our data, Section 5 describes our empirical strategy, Section 6 presents results, and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Frontier Crimes Regulation, Through Independence (1901-47)
In the 1840s, the British began to replace the Sikh government in Punjab with the same
colonial institutions that were taking hold across the British Raj—tax collectors, police, a
modern legal system, and other bureaucratic structures. However, they met limited success
in what was to become the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), in at least two im-
portant ways.6 First, much of the area was operating at a deficit due to limited crop yields
and heavy security expenses. Second, the British legal system, being codified throughout
India at the time through the 1860 Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, was vehemently resisted by local Pashtun clan leaders and other established elites in
favor of a customary legal system. Among other major differences, this customary system
forgave crimes for honor reasons, including killings. Such differences were highly publicized,
especially in cases involving women (Nichols, 2013).
After multiple decades of struggle, the British eventually decided to stop fighting the
customary legal system in favor of appropriating it in what would be codified in 1901 as the
6Initially, these areas were the districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail
and Dera Ghazi Khan in the Punjab province. These and several other districts were then
made into the NWFP in November, 1901. NWFP was renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in
2010.
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Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). On April 26, 1902, the Viceroy and Governor General
of India Lord Curzon traveled north to Peshawar to address 3,000 tribal leaders, giving “a
complete account of the new British frontier policy” (Akins, 2017):
“Now the great desire of the trans-border tribesman is, I take it, to maintain his
religion and his independence. The British Government have not the smallest
desire to interfere with either...The policy of the Government of India towards
the trans-border men is very simple, and it is this. We have no wish to seize your
territory or interfere with your independence.” (Thomas, 1906, p 422)
Under the FCR, ‘political agents’, appointed by the local Governor, were put in-charge of
the entire region. “While the British frontier policy under the FCR recognized the authority
of tribal leadership and their internal autonomy, the key to tribal administration along the
frontier, in Lord Curzon’s eyes, was the Political Agent (PA)” (Akins, 2017, p 7) Criminal
cases were to be first sent to a local council of elders, or Jirga, for trial. The political agent
would then approve of the Jirga’s ruling or could overturn it. Convicted criminals were not
allowed appeals. And importantly, Jirgas could not sentence anyone to death. The Jirgas
and the political agent could, however, pass collective judgment on communities, or punish
relatives of those convicted, rulings that were very much customary and would not be allowed
in the modern British legal system.
Perhaps of equal importance, with this unique legal system in the NWFP came a profound
lack of other institutions. Revenue collection was minimal (the political agent was also in
charge of this and had limited enforcement capacity despite absolute authority), though the
army was present near the borders, there were few police, and other public services were
non-existent. Local tribal communities were left more-or-less untouched, so long as crime
reports remained acceptable. Akins (2017) writes that “In the Tribal Areas, it is famously
said that the authority of the British Raj only existed along the main roads and a hundred
yards to each side. Beyond this lay the land of riwaj, or tribal custom.” As result, there
was a “striking dearth of schools, hospitals, and infrastructure by the end of British rule”
(Akins, 2017, p 8) in tribal areas.
Over the next half-century, FCR changed very little. Besides extending it to a few
additional regions, the legal systems and lack of other institutions remained fixed. The
British had found an acceptable solution in dealing with these areas.
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2.2 Frontier Crimes Regulation Since Independence (1947-2012)
Perhaps surprisingly, after independence FCR was not revoked from most of modern-day
Pakistan; the language of the regulation was left intact for over half of a century. Political
agents were still appointed, now by the head of the Punjab Province. Cases still went
to Jirgas. In fact, several years after the country’s independence, FCR was extended to
including additional parts of Balochistan and, briefly, new areas in Punjab and Sindh. It
was only over the course of several decades that it was slowly rolled back to the tribal areas
which remain under FCR today. We detail these geographic changes in Section 4 below.
Throughout this time period, the debate about FCR no longer centered around control-
ling criminal activity but focused more on the explicit choice of whether or not to extend
governance to tribal areas. In a famous address to the assembled leaders of the tribal jir-
gas of Pakistan on April 17, 1948, the founding leader of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah
discussed this choice. He said:
“Pakistan has no desire to unduly interfere with your internal freedom. On the
contrary; Pakistan wants to help you and make you, as far as it lies in our power,
self-reliant and self-sufficient and help in your educational, social and economic
uplift, and not be left as you are dependent on annual doles, as has been the
practice hitherto which meant that at the end of the year you were no better
off than beggars asking for allowances, if possible a little more. We want to put
you on your legs as self-respecting citizens who have the opportunities of fully
developing and producing what is best in you and your land. You know that the
Frontier Province is a deficit province...”7
Here Jinnah is making explicit the cost-benefit logic that this paper empirically tests when
he calls areas under FCR a deficit province.
The debate in recent decades has shifted much more towards representation, as it was not
until 1997 that Pakistanis in FCR regions were even granted representation in the national
legislature. Party-based elections were only introduced to areas under the FCR in 2013,
decades after the rest of the country.
7See http://www.jinnah.pk/2009/09/27/the-frontier-policy-of-pakistan/. Accessed Au-
gust 28, 2018.
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In May 2018, the President of Pakistan approved the 31st Amendment to the constitution,
which began the merger of tribal areas into the ‘settled’ part of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KP) province. Under the reform, FCR would no longer be applied for governing the re-
maining tribal and frontier regions. The local populations will elect new members to the KP
assembly within a year to get direct representation at the provincial level.
Importantly, tax exemptions for the newly incorporated area suggests that the bargaining
that preceded the merger focused extensively on how the state would phase-in taxation in the
area. The Economic Coordination Committee, the highest financial decision-making body
of the Government Pakistan, announced 5 year sales, income, and corporate tax exemptions
for these areas.8 Debates in the Khyber Pakhtunkwa Assembly also revolved around issues
of tax exemptions, aid packages, and law and order.9 This focus is consistent with that of
our paper—on the costs and benefits of government.
3 Theoretical Framework
Consider a government that prioritizes the governance of some regions over others. Its
territory is unit mass ordered in terms of potential income, I. Define I(φ) with φ ∈ [0, 1]
to be the income from any given point in the territory so that I ′ > 0 at all points. Assume
the government can tax that income, or collect revenue otherwise, at cost k so that net
revenue at any point, R, is equal to I − k. Figure 1a illustrates control of territory for
that government, where the vertical axis measures income and the horizontal axis captures
the priority of space, increasing priority from left to right. In the figure, that logic would
yield a frontier, φ∗, at which net income becomes zero, beyond which the government would
optimally choose to leave space ungoverned.
Citizens in the regions captured in Figure 1a have a choice between contributing to gov-
ernment revenue and receiving a resulting public good g, or resisting through non-payment or
perhaps open rebellion.10 To have uncontested governance in a given region revenue extrac-
8See https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/323999-ecc-approves-tax-exemptions-for
-fata-pata-for-next-five-years, accessed Aug 28, 2018.
9See https://dailytimes.com.pk/245672/kp-assembly-seals-merger-with-fata/,
accessed Aug 28, 2018.
10This is similar to the tradeoff of a constrained kleptocrat modeled in Grossman and Noh
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Figure 1: Framework
tion must leave the representative individual in any region at least as well off as they would
be without government.11 That is, it must be that g ≥ i, where i is the representative indi-
vidual’s share of a region’s I under the next best alternative. Assume no transfers between
regions and that public goods provision is functional so that g′(R) > 0 for all R > 0–i.e.
government can always meet the revolution constraint in areas with positive revenue where
there is no competition.12 Finally, assume g′′(R) > 0 so the government has economies of
scale in public goods provision, but g(R(1)) < R(1) so there is no free lunch. This describes
the generic setting where public good provision is correlated with revenue, I − k, but must
lie below the revenue curve across all governed territories.
Now allow for informal local governance in low-income areas, perhaps by tribes or clans.
Such informal governance, which might use traditional institutions like the Maliks and elders,
is simple and low-cost, making it efficient to use in areas where government revenue potential
is minimal. Moreover, it can be financed through informal taxes on agricultural goods unable
to reach markets and requires fewer formal institutions. This makes revenue collection
easier by informal groups than by government. We formalize this intuition by assuming
tribes pay a lower cost to collect revenue, kT < k so that net tribal revenue is greater than
government revenue. But, consistent with the literature on efficient production requiring
strong institutions we assume that tribes are not as good at providing public goods as
(1990,9).
11We can think of governance here as a “contingent consent” equilibrium, in the sense of
Lake (2010).
12This is an obvious simplification but is useful for fixing intuition.
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the government. Formally define gT (R) such that g
′
T < g
′∀R and assume g(I(1) − k) >
gT (I(1)− kT ) so that at high levels of income the government is a better provider of public
goods than the rebels. Figure 1b represents this interaction and the intersection of g and gT
defines a frontier φˆ, to the left of which tribes will control territory, because residents prefer
to receive public services from tribes than from government. If the government attempts to
collect revenue in this area residents will revolt.
Given this simple set-up, we can proceed to analyze the effects of an increase in the value
of land in some or all areas in the state. In the specific case of the Green Revolution, we can
imagine that the introduction of high-yielding variety seeds will yield an increase in taxable
income I but not necessarily shift the relative costs of revenue collection. This would come
with an increase in the amount of g available to maintain the contingent consent equilibrium
between citizens and the government. This shift up in g can be seen in Figure 1c. As we
can see, this will lead to shifts up in revenue under either party’s control, shifts up in both
parties’ public goods provision, but a net shift down in the proportion of ungoverned space
in the country from φˆ to φ˜ as government has greater economies of scale to public goods
provision. Given government’s comparative advantage in public goods provision a shift up
in income will necessarily lead to shift out in the governed frontier.
This simple framework leads to two predictions that correspond to the two questions we
ask in this paper: (i) an increase in potential benefits for the government relative to tribes
will (weakly) lead to an increase in the proportion of the country governed; and (ii) a larger
increase in potential benefits in one ungoverned region relative to another (weakly) increases
the probability of the former region becoming governed relative to the latter. This second
prediction is not shown in our figures but intuitively follows from Figure 1c. If one area
gains more potential benefits than the other, it will move up in priority and be more likely
to end up to the right of the new frontier φ˜.13
Note this very simple framework makes predictions that several other simple models do
not. One competing model could be that the extent of ungoverned space in a country over
time is simply a function of capacity constraints—the government may only have the military
capacity, for example, to bring one area into formal government at a time. Another set of
13In both cases in a richer model the predictions would be weakly positive because it could
be that a change in potential benefit is not enough to move the frontier at all, or that the
costs of collecting such revenue offset the benefits.
10
competing models could be those with the same mechanics but different costs and benefits
driving the governments choice. For example, the government might care more about the
changing strategic value of land domestically and/or internationally Atzili (2011), or leaders
may only care about available rents to be captured, including votes (Acemoglu, Robinson,
and Santos, 2013). Neither of these models predicts that the initial choice to govern will
be independent of crop suitability once we condition out factors influencing the difficulty of
revenue collection and productivity given initial technology (in our case productivity proxies
in 1901) and neither predicts that changes in marginal revenue will drive changes in control
efforts. We will speak to these specifically in our identification and robustness check sections.
One could write an alternative model where the choice to be governed rests with citizens,
who petition a central state to extend governance to their areas. Such a model would
be consistent with the results in Dasgupta (2018) who finds that the Green Revolution in
India strengthened the incentives and capacity of politically excluded groups. As we do not
have data on specific demands of citizens around the advent of the Green Revolution in
Pakistan, we do not focus on this mechanism of change, though we note that this story is
complementary to the state-centered story we report.
Our theory is broadly consistent with work by scholars of state capacity who more explic-
itly consider the interaction of a central state and a local power group (e.g. Gerring et al.,
2011; Migdal, 1988; O’donnell, 2004). While Gerring et al. (2011) and Scott (2009), for
example, examine principally how the characteristics of peripheral regions/states impact the
ultimate bargain between local and central elites, we focus on the incentives of the dominant
state. From that perspective the provision of FCR is one channel through which a ‘weak
state’ as in Migdal’s thesis, or a ‘brown area’ as in O’donnell (2004), could be co-opted. And
its removal reflected in part a decision by the central state to seek more direct control.
Note also that our explanation assumes that the cost of governing a territory was more-
or-less static during the period we study. In our case most of the shocks we study were in the
mid-1960s, which was not a time of major change to the technologies of rebellion available
to the potential insurgents in FATA, nor to the government forces. The big shock to these
technologies was the loss of Bangladesh, which did not come until 7 years after most of the
changes we study.14
14See Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) and Lyall and Wilson (2009) on how technological
innovation can change the cost of rebellion and counterinsurgency.
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4 Data
4.1 FCR Application, 1901-2012
In order to understand both the British and later Pakistan’s decisions to apply FCR to and
continue to maintain FCR in large parts of Pakistan, we use primary legal documents to
create a dataset of when and where FCR has applied between 1901 and 2012 for all 403 sub-
districts (tehsils) in Pakistan. Basic summary stats are presented in Table 1 and in Figure 2.
The years selected in the table and figure were intentional. They represent all of the years
in which there have been changes in FCR status of at least one sub-district, in addition to
2012 (or present as it has not changed since then). The first two years demonstrate that
there was very little change in FCR application between 1901 and Pakistan’s independence
from the British in 1947. The following six years follow the changes that occurred before
and after the Green Revolution. In 1965, the biggest roll-back in FCR thus far occurred.
This roll-back will provide the primary variation for our differences-in-differences analysis,
which we will discuss below. The choice of 2012 demonstrates that FCR application has not
changed since 1978.
Table 1: FCR Application Summary Statistics
% of Sub-districts under FCR % area under FCR (km2)
Year:
1901 42.93 52.08
1947 42.43 50.07
1957 43.42 58.15
1962 46.65 59.66
1964 34.00 52.12
1965 23.57 21.77
1974 15.63 10.21
1978 11.91 02.97
2012 11.91 02.97
Notes: Percentage sub-districts (tehsils) under FCR based on a total of 403 sub-
districts. Area under FCR based on a total area of 872,027 square kilometers.
A complication in coding FCR exists due the presence the Princely States that comprised
12
Figure 2: FCR Application over Time
Sub-district (tehsil) boundaries marked. White sub-districts are those for which we do not have data, due
to changes in sub-district boundaries between 1901 and 2012. For the main analysis we code all Princely
States as FCR, though their formal status differed. Please see text for a discussion of the robustness of our
results if we do not consider these areas. 13
a third regime of governance under the British Raj and Pakistani government. While techni-
cally not governed under the FCR, we code Princely States as FCR for the main analysis as
they were not directly under the ambit of the central state. We also report robustness of the
results to an alternate coding where we drop Princely States from the analysis. Also note
that several princely states were shifted to be under FCR officially when they were dissolved
rather than into Pakistan’s central government.
4.2 Crop Suitability and the Green Revolution
For a time-invariant measure of potential crop yields, we utilize crop suitability data from
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 2012). The FAO pro-
vides us with sub-district level indices of agro-climactical suitability for a variety of crops.
We focus on wheat which was by far the most common crop in Pakistan around the time of
the Green Revolution and the crop that would overwhelmingly benefit from the new tech-
nologies. The FAO indices are based on factors such as location-specific geography, rainfall,
and temperature over the period 1961-1990. Our measure of crop suitability is the average
of these FAO indices across different potential irrigation levels at low input.
Figure 3 shows the extent of geographic variation in crop suitability for wheat. While
most of Pakistan falls in the medium to not suitable categories, there is a fair amount of
geographic variation, especially in areas that at one point had or have FCR.15
Though the data used to create these FAO indices include more recent weather infor-
mation than many of the years in our analysis, we believe that the cross-sectional variation
applies across this time period given that the geography is fixed and that rainfall and tem-
perature are very slow to change. Consequently, we use these data as control variables in
the analysis on the initial application of FCR.
Importantly, we have also documented the point at which the Green Revolution first
began in Pakistan—1965. These changes were driven by the technological changes in wheat
production, which was the most important Green Revolution Crop in Pakistan. And with
15Note that the FAO crop suitability data is provided in raster images with various res-
olutions depending on the crop. Sub-district-level means for each input level are extracted
from each raster images, and then these means are averaged to form a single index for each
crop.
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Figure 3: Crop Suitability
Sub-district (tehsil) boundaries marked. Crop suitability scores are as follows: 0 is not suitable, 1 is very
marginal, 2 is marginal, 3 is moderate, 4 is medium, 5 is good, 6 is high, and 7 is very high. Data from FAO,
2012.
15
wheat the key changes were not in terms of inputs. Rather, the key change was the in-
troduction of new high-yielding varieties first introduced in Punjab in 1965.16 In Western
Pakistan, wheat production increased by 79 percent from 1966 to 1969, with a peak growth
rate of agricultural output of 15 percent during fiscal 1967-68 (Child and Kaneda, 1975).
The Green Revolution in South Asia was characterized by increased crop yields among
the staple crops. With wheat there were few required changes in input technologies, labor to
capital ratios, or irrigation. We will therefore consider the Green Revolution to mitigate the
importance of crop suitability for wheat.17 This is consistent with Foster and Rosenzweig
(1996) and with Child and Kaneda (1975).18
4.3 Pakistan Censuses of Agriculture
We have also hand coded the 1960 and 1972 Pakistan Censuses of Agriculture for all sub-
districts for which information was available in both years (109). While this is only roughly
one quarter of sub-districts, it does cover all of Pakistan, including 13 sub-districts in
Balochistan, 15 in NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 62 in Punjab, and 19 in Sindh.
For each of these sub-districts, we have total cropped area, wheat cropped area, irrigated
area, cropped area with fertilizer, and farms using fertilizer. In 1960 we additionally have
number of ploughs, and in 1972 number of tractors.
16See Dowswell (1989). Using similar data, the International Maize and What Improve-
ment Center (CIMMYT) reports that the 118156 wheat variety, the basis for the most im-
portant Green Revolution varieties, was first released in 1966 (Lantican, Dubin, and Morris,
2005).
17This is different from Southeast Asia where the introduction of new rice varieties effected
both input requirements (more fertilizer) as well as the modes of cultivation and distribution
of returns (see e.g. Scott, 1977).
18Note that we are unable to provide district-specific trends in Green Revolution take-up
for Pakistan as Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) do for India due to a lack of available data.
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5 Empirical Approach
We conduct three complementary analyses. First, we correlate fixed, sub-district-level char-
acteristics, including crop suitability, with the initial decision that the British made to select
roughly half of Pakistan for FCR in 1901. Second, we correlate crop suitability with changes
in agricultural inputs and usage during the Green Revolution. Finally, we exploit the differ-
ential impact of the Green Revolution by crop suitability to understand Pakistan’s decisions
to roll FCR back across parts of the country throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
5.1 Initial FCR Application in 1901
For our first analysis, we will use a simple empirical specification:
FCR applied 1901d = α + β1 Sub-district area + β2 Ruggednessd
+β3 Distance to capitald + β4 Latituded + β5 Longituded + β6 Crop suitabilityd + d
(1)
Where FCR applied 1901d is a dummy for whether FCR was initially applied to sub-district
d in the 1901 FCR legislation, Sub-district aread is is the area of sub-district d in thousands
of square kilometers, Ruggednessd is a sub-district measure of terrain roughness (SD of height
above sea level), Distance to capitald is the distance, in 1000s of kilometers, from the centroid
of each sub-district to the capital through the late 1960s (Karachi), Latituded and Longituded
are the latitude and longitude of each sub-district’s centroid, and Crop suitabilityd is a sub-
district’s crop suitability measure. Note that FCR was originally applied at the district level,
so we cluster the standard errors by district. We leave the specification at the sub-district
level, however, to avoid having to aggregate up the geo-specific measure any more than has
already been done.
This analysis will give us a correlation. What is informative is that while sub-district
geographic characteristics that proxy for productivity at the time of territorial demarcation
(which happened over the latter half of the 19th century), the challenge of exerting control,
and transportation costs all correlate in the expected direction with FCR application, FCR
application is conditionally independent of crop suitability for wheat. We proxy for initial
productivity with sub-district area because administrative units were sized to capture similar
populations during the initial demarcation in the mid-19th century and more productive
places were more densely populated at the time. We therefore expect productive areas to
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have had physically smaller administrative units. We proxy for the challenge of exerting
control with the standard deviation of elevation. It is well established that rougher terrain
is harder to police given modern military technologies and this was certainly true in a time
before mechanized transportation. We proxy for transportation costs with the distance to
the Karachi, the main port at the time for areas that would become Pakistan, because wheat
was an important export crop. The value of controlling territory where it was produced was
therefore likely related to the costs of moving it to market. Controlling for the latitude and
longitude of a subdistrict is a more flexible way to account for all of the geographic variation
in our sample. We do not have pre-1901 data to control for potential omitted variables
such as differential time trends in productivity, or for specific time-invariant covariates of a
sub-district. As such, we will only consider results from this analysis as suggestive.
5.2 The Green Revolution and Agricultural Productivity Gains
in Pakistan
We are interested in confirming that the spread of high-yielding varieties of wheat seeds
in Pakistan at the onset of the Green Revolution did increase the productivity (and thus
potential government revenue) disproportionately in originally less-suitable areas as this is a
necessary condition for us to test our theory in the next subsection. We would ideally use a
direct measure of productivity, either yields or government revenue, but we have not found
records of such measures for this time period. As a second best, we will consider agricultural
input and usage variables from the agricultural census that we believe would be positively
correlated with yields and revenue. That is, we would expect greater differential investments
during the Green Revolution in places that gained differentially in terms of productivity
during this time.
For this analysis, we will use another correlational specification:
Y(1972-1960)d = α + β1 Below Median Wheat Suitabilityd + β2 Aread + d (2)
WhereY(1972-1960)d is an outcome from the census of agriculture in 1972 minus that same
outcome in 1960 and Aread is a control for the area of the subdistrict. Again, we cluster
standard errors by district. We also limit our analysis to sub-districts that were not subject
to FCR at the start of the Green Revolution, akin to limiting to “control” sub-districts so
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that we can document a pattern between suitability and agricultural productivity without
changes in FCR status potentially confounding our simple analysis.
5.3 FCR Application and the Green Revolution
For our third and primary analysis we exploit pre-existing cross-sectional variation in the
marginal impact of Green Revolution wheat varieties on productivity with an exogenously
timed technological change (the introduction of those varieties) to identify incentives for
rolling back the FCR. Our primary specification will be as follows:
FCR applieddt = α + β1 Crop suitabilityd + β2 Post GRt+
Post GR Crop suitabilitydt + δt + dt
for sub-district d ∈ {ever had fcr}
for year t ∈ {1947, 1957, 1962, 1964, 1965, 1974, 1978}
(3)
Here FCR applieddt is a dummy for whether FCR continued to apply to sub-district d in
year t, Crop suitabilityd is our crop suitability measure of sub-district d, and Post GR Crop suitabilitydt
is the linear interaction of the the two terms. δt are year fixed effects. Note that we will not
be able to separately identify β1 from sub-district fixed effects.
Analysis for Equation 3 is limited to sub-districts in Pakistan that ever had FCR and
to years t ∈ {1947, 1957, 1962, 1964, 1965, 1974, 1978}. The latter limitation is to all the
years in which one or more sub-districts changed FCR application, within 20 years of the
Green Revolution.19 We limit to these years as an event study of sorts, assuming that there
was enough of a political cost to changing the FCR legislation that it could not be done
continuously. This approach matches the historical record in that decisions to remove sub-
districts from the law happened episodically and in groups. There are two more extreme
alternatives: (i) leave the data at the yearly level and run the same specification; or (ii)
collapse the data down to two observations for each sub-district and run a simple difference
of means between pre and post the Green Revolution. We see our specification as superior
to (i) because it will not over-emphasize the many zeros that likely did not represent real
decisions and to (ii) because it allows for a more accurate accounting for variation across
19And more or less within a much larger window considering the little change in FCR
between 1901 and 1947 and the no change in FCR after 1978.
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time.20
With year fixed effects, and with a differences-in-differences estimator, we will consider
this analysis to capture the causal differential impact of the Green Revolution, or more
generally of an exogenously timed change in a sub-district’s agricultural land value, on
the choice by the Pakistani government to maintain or remove FCR. For our identification
strategy to hold, we need that there were no time-varying omitted variables that differentially
impacted sub-districts before and after 1965. In other words, we need that there were no
other major changes other than the Green Revolution happening at or around 1965 that
had differential impacts on FCR application by crop suitability. We will discuss other major
potential changes in the context of our results below.
6 Results
This section presents results from two complementary analyses of the choice to apply, and
then maintain, FCR provision in regions of Pakistan. First, we correlate fixed, sub-district-
level crop suitability with the initial decision that the British made to select roughly half of
Pakistan for FCR in 1901. Second, we exploit the differential impact of the Green Revolution
by crop suitability to understand Pakistan’s decisions to roll FCR back across parts of the
country throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
6.1 Initial FCR Application in 1901
Table 2 presents results for this analysis. In-line with our framework, column (1) shows that
the British applied FCR in less productive places (under our assumption that sub-district
area was negatively correlated with productivity), column (2) shows that places which were
more costly to tax due to rough terrain, as proxied by height above sea level, were more likely
to be in the FCR, and column (3) shows that places with higher transportation costs (and
thus lower revenue potential given productivity) were more likely to be included. Column
20Note that if we take the conservative approach and run analysis on data for all 20 years
before and after the Green Revolution as in (i), we obtain coefficients with 1/3 to 1/2 of the
magnitude and the same level of significance. These are still very meaningful magnitudes.
Results available upon request.
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(4) shows that latitude and longitude were also important predictors. Column (5) does show
that there is an unconditionally positive correlation between wheat crop suitability and initial
FCR application, but column (6) then shows that once our other factors are accounted for
the sub-district suitability for wheat is uncorrelated with initial FCR application.
Table 2: Crop Suitability and Initial FCR Application
FCR applied in 1901 (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sub-district Area (Square KM / 1000) 0.019** 0.004
(0.009) (0.008)
Sub-district SD of height above sea level (FT / 100) 0.023*** -0.004
(0.006) (0.005)
Distance to Capital (KM / 1000) 0.351*** -0.543
(0.107) (0.529)
Longitude of sub-district centroid -0.178*** -0.165***
(0.013) (0.024)
Latitude of sub-district centroid 0.163*** 0.226***
(0.011) (0.056)
Sub-district Wheat Crop Suitability 0.061* -0.007
(0.031) (0.027)
Mean of dependent variable 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429
# Observations 403 403 403 403 403 403
# Clusters 129 129 129 129 129 129
R-Squared 0.016 0.145 0.074 0.591 0.034 0.598
Notes: Unit of observation is the sub-district (tehsil). *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level
reported in parentheses. Crop suitability scores are as follows: 0 is not suitable, 1 is very marginal, 2 is marginal, 3 is moderate, 4 is medium,
5 is good, 6 is high, and 7 is very high. Karachi was the capital at independence and the main export port in the late-1900s.
Thus we argue that initial assignment to the FCR is plausibly exogenous to wheat crop
suitability once we condition for proxies for local productivity and the cost of imposing state
institutions.
6.2 The Green Revolution and Agricultural Productivity Gains
in Pakistan
Ideally, we would analyze the effects of the Green Revolution on taxes and other state revenue
to support our theory. However, after considerable effort, we are unable to locate or confirm
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Table 3: The Green Revolution and Changes in Agricultural Inputs
Difference between 1972 and 1960 values Farms with
Cropped Wheat Irrigated Cropped Area Farms using Tractors ’72 −
Area Area Area with Fertilizer Fertilizer Ploughs ’60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Linear models
Sub-district Wheat Suitability -27313** -6996* -21441*** -34656*** -3968*** -395
(10294) (3807) (4407) (7800) (621) (1128)
Mean of dependent variable 135309 40521 83165 144702 3966 573
# Observations 96 96 95 92 92 89
# Clusters 58 58 57 56 56 54
R-Squared 0.072 0.063 0.189 0.226 0.375 0.004
Panel B: Non-linear models
Below Median Wheat Suitability (=1) 42424 13524 49229*** 71816** 12247*** -5235
(34818) (10073) (18233) (30154) (2398) (4314)
Mean of dependent variable 135309 40521 83165 144702 3966 573
# Observations 96 96 95 92 92 89
# Clusters 58 58 57 56 56 54
R-Squared 0.017 0.034 0.086 0.097 0.302 0.036
Notes :*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses. All regressions include controls
for total sub-district (tehsil) area. Data source: 1960 and 1972 Pakistan Censuses of Agriculture. Sample: tehsils for which agricultural census
information was available in both 1960 and 1972 and that were not subject to FCR at the start of the Green Revolution. For reference, there
are 215 total tehils subject to FCR after the start of the Green Revolution. All areas are in Acres. Crop suitability scores are as follows: 0 is
not suitable, 1 is very marginal, 2 is marginal, 3 is moderate, 4 is medium, 5 is good, 6 is high, and 7 is very high
the existence of these data at the sub-district level for the relevant period. Instead, we provide
evidence corroborating the fact that initially less suitable areas of Pakistan gained the most
from the Green Revolution in Table 3 using data from the 1960 and 1972 agricultural censuses
in Pakistan. We correlate wheat suitability, both linearly in Panel A and with a dummy
for below median suitability in Panel B, with changes in cropped area, wheat area, irrigated
area, cropped area with fertilizer, farms using fertilizer, and farm equipment (tractors in
1972 and ploughs in 1960). We find that areas of low wheat suitability saw disproportionate
increases in all of these measures between 1960 and 1972. These increases are significant
for eight of the 12 regressions. In all cases, the increases are large in magnitude as well.
For example, irrigated area increased by 83,165 acres in above median wheat suitability sub-
districts during this team period. In below median wheat suitability sub-districts it increased
by an additional 59 percent, or 49,229 acres.
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While correlational and on a limited sample, these results are consistent with the fact
that that the extension of state control led to shifts in investment decisions in the same
pattern our simple logic predicts. In other words, as it was originally less suitable areas
that gained the most from the Green Revolution, it is those areas that received the greatest
increased investment in resources (many of which were state controlled in Pakistan during
this period). While we have argued above that with Green Revolution varieties of wheat
there were few required changes in input technologies, labor to capital ratios, or irrigation,
we would also expect changes at the extensive margin (land that was not used before the
Green Revolution but was after) to drive these inputs up as cropped area increased.
6.3 FCR Application and the Green Revolution
Now we present results for our third and primary analysis—exploiting the differential impact
of the Green Revolution by crop suitability to understand the integration of peripheral
areas into the state throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Figure 4 presents our primary result
visually. It shows FCR application before and after the Green Revolution, where we group
sub-districts into above and below median crop suitability. We see that after the Green
Revolution low suitability districts became much less likely to have FCR maintained.
Table 4 presents regression analysis results. Panel A presents models with a linear mea-
sure of wheat suitability, and Panel B using a dummy variable for below median wheat
suitability. In both panels, we first present a simple correlation of sub-district crop suit-
ability and FCR application across the years in this analysis with and without year fixed
effects. In columns (1) and (2), we see that there is no clear correlation between sub-district
wheat suitability and FCR status when we do not use our Green Revolution instrument but
do use the same empirical specification and sample otherwise. This is not surprising as our
previous results from 1901 suggest that wheat suitability might not have been an important
predictor of FCR application initially, and there were very few changes in FCR before the
Green Revolution. It is also consistent with the fact that the Green Revolution cause wheat
suitability to matter differentially at a discrete point in time.
Second, we present a differences-in-differences specification, adding year fixed effects and
then sub-district controls column-by-column. We can see that crop suitability differentially
positively predicts FCR’s continued application after the Green Revolution relative to before
by 9.6 percentage points regardless of specification in Panel A. In Panel B, when we divide
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Figure 4: FCR application over time by crop suitability
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Points show the mean sub-district FCR application dummy values in years used in analaysis within above
(high) and below (low) medium wheat crop suitability bins. Lines are fitted using locally weighted scatterplot
smoothing.
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Table 4: Crop Suitability and FCR Application Before and After the Green Revolution
FCR applied (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Linear models
Sub-district Wheat Suitability 0.029 0.029 -0.013 -0.056*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.030)
Post Green Revolution (=1) -0.741*** -0.741***
(0.071) (0.071)
Wheat Suitability * Post Green Revolution 0.096*** 0.096***
(0.031) (0.031)
Mean of dependent variable 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952
# Observations 1421 1421 1421 1421
# Clusters 74 74 74 74
R-Squared 0.006 0.291 0.308 0.447
Panel B: Non-linear models
Below Median Wheat Suitability (=1) -0.169** -0.169** -0.054 0.187**
(0.070) (0.070) (0.074) (0.075)
Post Green Revolution (=1) -0.510*** -0.510***
(0.088) (0.088)
Below Median Wheat Suitability (=1) * Post -0.270*** -0.270***
(0.092) (0.092)
Mean of dependent variable 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952
# Observations 1421 1421 1421 1421
# Clusters 74 74 74 74
R-Squared 0.028 0.312 0.330 0.448
Year FEs? NO YES YES YES
Sub-district controls NO NO NO YES
Notes :*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in
parentheses. Crop suitability scores are as follows: 0 is not suitable, 1 is very marginal, 2 is marginal, 3
is moderate, 4 is medium, 5 is good, 6 is high, and 7 is very high. Post Green Revolution is a dummy
for years after 1964. Years in analysis limited to those years where any sub-district had FCR removed—
1922,1937,1947,1956,1963,1964,1971,1973,1977. Sub-dsitrict controls are Sub-district Area (Square KM /
1000), Sub-district SD of height above sea level (FT / 100), Distance to Capital (KM / 1000), and latitude
and longitude.
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crop suitability at the median, we find that below median crop suitability sub-districts
are less likely to have FCR retained after the Green Revolution. This point estimate is
substantively large — 27 percentage points.21 Note also that before the introduction of the
Green Revolution wheat suitability negatively predicts FCR application once we introduce
sub-district controls, which is what our theory would predict.
This result is consistent with the fact that the Green Revolution mitigated the importance
of crop suitability. As mentioned above, the Green Revolution is characterized by increased
crop yields among the staple crops of South Asia with little to no required changes in input
technologies, labor to capital ratios, or irrigation. Thus places that were once harder to
farm became relatively easier, causing lower-suitability sub-districts to ‘catch-up’ to other
districts in potential revenue collection. Thus lower-suitability districts were more likely to
switch from expected revenue negative to positive as a result of the Green Revolution, and
these districts were relatively more likely to have their FCR application removed.22
Our results suggest a fairly large magnitude of an effect as well. We find that a one unit
increase in crop suitability, from say ‘medium’ to ‘good,’ is associated with a 10 percentage
points differential increase in the likelihood that FCR continues to apply to a sub-district
following the Green Revolution.
6.4 Robustness Checks
We present four robustness checks to our Green Revolution result. First, we conduct a
placebo check in which we add to our main specification the interaction of a dummy for post
Green Revolution with crop suitability levels for other crops that were not impacted by the
Green Revolution in Pakistan during this time period (rice became important in the 1980s),
including gram (the second most important crop in Pakistan before the Green Revolution by
cultivated area), and an average over gram, cotton, and rice. Results are presented in Table
21Note that the coefficients on the interaction term and post-Green Revolution dummy
do not change with the addition of sub-district controls. That is because all sub-district
controls are time-invariant and therefore orthogonal to both time and its interaction with
wheat suitability by construction. Controlling for time-invariant factors with sub-district
fixed effects does not change the results.
22This is consistent with Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) and with Child and Kaneda (1975).
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5. Note we do not show cotton or rice separately. For cotton, this is because it is 97 percent
correlated with wheat suitability in our sample. For rice, it is because there is no variation
in rice suitability in all of Balochistan (it is zero throughout). In columns (2) and (3), our
results remain completely driven by wheat crop suitability. This assures us that our results
are not driven by some correlate of wheat suitable sub-districts that has nothing to do with
potential government revenue—if such was the case it seems unlikely such a spurious result
would exist with crop suitability for wheat but not the second most important crop or an
average across three important crops.
Table 5: Robustness Check 1—Other Crop Suitability Placebos
FCR maintained (=1)
(1) (2) (3)
Wheat Crop Suitability * Post Green Revolution 0.096*** 0.087 0.147*
(0.033) (0.074) (0.082)
Gram Crop Suitability * Post Green Revolution 0.011
(0.083)
Other Crop Average Crop Suitability * Post Green Revolution -0.090
(0.125)
Mean of dependent variable 0.952 0.952 0.952
# Observations 1421 1421 1421
# Clusters 74 74 74
R-Squared 0.454 0.454 0.455
Year FEs? YES YES YES
Sub-district FEs? YES YES YES
Notes :*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses.
Other crop suitability is the average of gram, cotton, and rice crop suitability.
Second, we conduct a placebo check in which we vary the year in which the Green
Revolution supposedly took place. If there were pre-existing trends in low- relative to high-
suitability sub-districts, such a placebo check should pick them up. Results are presented
in Table 6. As you can see, we only get results when we use the true year of the Green
Revolution in Pakistan. This is encouraging, and consistent with the pre-trends visible in
Figure 4.
Third, most importantly, we turn to alternative changes that could have occurred in
exactly 1965 in Pakistan that differentially affected some sub-districts over others in a way
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Table 6: Robustness Check 2—Year Placebos
FCR maintained (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wheat Crop Suitability * Post Green Revolution 0.096***
(0.033)
Wheat Crop Suitability * Post 1957 -0.063
(0.046)
Wheat Crop Suitability * Post 1962 -0.008
(0.033)
Wheat Crop Suitability * Post 1964 0.031
(0.035)
Mean of dependent variable 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952
# Observations 1421 1421 1421 1421
# Clusters 74 74 74 74
R-Squared 0.454 0.433 0.428 0.430
Year FEs? YES YES YES YES
Sub-district FEs? YES YES YES YES
Notes :*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in
parentheses.
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that is correlated with both wheat suitability and FCR application.23 From the history of
Pakistan around 1965, two plausible alternative stories arise. The first is Pakistan’s on-going
dispute with India over areas of northern Pakistan, including Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.
In 1965, there was a war between the two countries in this region which involved skirmishes in
Kashmir (the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965). It is possible that this war constrained Pakistan’s
ability to roll back FCR from the northern region of the country in 1965. If this is the case,
and the northern area is on average more suitable for wheat than Balochistan, where FCR
was mainly rolled back in 1965, we could be obtaining spurious results. To ensure this is not
the case, in Table 7, column (2), we limit our analysis to only Balochistan, the province for
which there are major changes in FCR status in 1965. We see that, if anything, our result
becomes stronger when limited to only Balochistan. This ensures that the northern areas of
Pakistan are not driving our results.
Table 7: Robustness Check 3—Focus on Balochistan
FCR maintained (=1)
(1) (2) (3)
Wheat Suitability * Post Green Revolution 0.096*** 0.198** 0.190*
(0.033) (0.083) (0.100)
Mean of dependent variable 0.952 0.842 0.799
# Observations 1421 420 315
# Clusters 74 25 18
R-Squared 0.454 0.776 0.845
Year FEs? YES YES YES
Sub-district FEs? YES YES YES
Sample All Balochistan Non-Pashtun
Only Balochistan
Notes :*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in
parentheses.
The second alternative story that we consider takes place within Balochistan. Balochistan
has historically been dominated by two ethnic groups—the Baloch and the Pashtuns. The
Pashtuns have lived in the north of the province and the Baloch in the south. The President
23Note we consider the Green Revolution to encapsulate all changes in crop technology at
the time, so we are not concerned about other simultaneous agricultural advances.
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of Pakistan in 1965, General Ayub Khan, had different relationships with the two groups
that might have affected FCR decisions, possibly because of an active insurgent movement
in certain parts of Balochistan. If the Pashtun or Baloch groups were systematically on more
or less suitable land and General Khan wanted to extend formal governance to specifically
Pashtun areas for security reasons, the mechanism of change would be different from the
one posited. To ensure this is not the case, in Table 7, column (3), we limit our analysis
to only the historically Balochi sub-districts in Balochistan.24 We find that our results
generally hold (our standard errors get larger with the smaller sample but the main result
remains significant at 10%). Thus, putting together our results from this table, even in
the Baloch-dominated districts in Balochistan, we see the same relationship hold in which
crop suitability differentially positively predicts FCR’s continued application after the Green
Revolution relative to before.
Fourth, we ensure that our results are robust to whether we consider princely states
to be ungoverned (and thus coded as if under FCR) or governed (and thus coded as not
under FCR). As we can see in Tables 8 and 9, our results, including our initial application
correlations, are not at all sensitive to how we code princely states. This is not a surprise at
they do not represent a large area of Pakistan.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the trajectory of state presence within the borders of modern
day Pakistan is consistent with a theoretical framework in which states extend governance
to areas where the economic benefits of developing full institutions through taxation and
resource extraction outweigh the costs of doing so. Using crop suitability data from the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, we show first that the choice by
the British to apply FCR to over half of Pakistan in 1901 was conditionally uncorrelated
with crop suitability. We then exploit the fact that Green Revolution had a greater marginal
effect in areas of low crop suitability to understand Pakistan’s selective roll-back of FCR
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. We find that sub-districts more suitable to agriculture
were more likely to see continued FCR application after the Green Revolution raised the
24Historically, Baloch and Pashtun sub-districts were hand-coded using a map created by
Dr. Michael Izady at www.Gulf2000.Columbia.edu/maps.shtml.
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Table 8: Robustness Check 4—Crop Suitability and FCR (dropping Princely States)
FCR maintained (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sub-district Area (Square KM / 1000) 0.024** 0.019*
(0.011) (0.010)
Sub-district SD of height above sea level (FT / 100) 0.023*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.007)
Distance to Capital (KM / 1000) 0.322*** -0.108
(0.113) (0.178)
Sub-district Wheat Crop Suitability 0.057* 0.079**
(0.032) (0.039)
Mean of dependent variable 0.425 0.425 0.425 0.425 0.425
# Observations 360 360 360 360 360
# Clusters 119 119 119 119 119
R-Squared 0.016 0.130 0.059 0.031 0.174
Notes :*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses.
Table 9: Robustness Check 5—FCR application after the Green Revolution (with and with-
out Princely States)
FCR maintained (=1)
(1) (2)
Wheat Suitability * Post Green Revolution 0.096*** 0.086**
(0.031) (0.033)
Mean of dependent variable 0.952 0.960
# Observations 1421 1225
# Clusters 74 67
R-Squared 0.454 0.423
Sample All Non-Princely
States
Notes :*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district
level reported in parentheses.
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relative value of less-suitable sub-districts.
Because the timing of the Green Revolution in Pakistan was exogenous to local politics
we are able to isolate a plausibly causal effect of agricultural land value on FCR application.
Our results suggest a large effect. Specifically, a one unit increase in crop suitability from
‘medium’ to ‘good’ is associated with a differential increase in a sub-district’s probability
of being left ungoverned by over twenty percent following the Green Revolution, relative
to before. Though counter intuitive at first glance, this pattern is actually consistent with
our hypothesis that the Green Revolution mitigated the importance of crop suitability and
thus caused lower-suitability sub-districts to ‘catch-up’ to other districts in potential revenue
extraction. Thus lower-suitability districts were more likely to switch from expected revenue
negative to positive as a result of the Green Revolution, and these districts were relatively
more likely to have FCR removed.
These results are important for at least four reasons. First, we provide micro-evidence
on the importance of extractable land value, and technology-driven changes in land value, to
the choice to govern land, supporting the hypothesis of a rich macroeconomic development
literature when applied at the sub-national level. Second, we provide additional evidence on
the importance of the Green Revolution in South Asia, not only in increasing land values and
growth but in influencing the choice of the Pakistani government to govern (and Pakistani
citizens to accept government in) large parts of the country that had thus far remained
ungoverned. Third, we present evidence in support of the idea of Fearon (2008) and Besley
and Persson (2011) of ungoverned-by-choice space. Lastly, we provide heartening evidence
that technological chance can lead to ungoverned spaces being folded into country’s cores
without civil war or serious violence. The parts of Pakistan that still have FCR today are,
of course, the most resistant to government control, but so were many parts of the sub-
districts that were brought into the government in the 1970s. Yet what was stopping the
government from integrating them, and those living in these peripheral areas from consenting
to integration without violence, at least in part, a simple cost-benefit calculation.
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